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by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Gianluca Mazzoni
Background

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah (aviyonah@umich.edu)
is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan Law School in Ann
Arbor. Gianluca Mazzoni (gmazzoni@umich.
edu) received his SJD in international tax in
2020 from the University of Michigan Law
School.
In this article, Avi-Yonah and Mazzoni
examine the Tax Court’s decision in Coca-Cola,
the first decisive IRS victory in a major transfer
pricing case since 1979.
Copyright 2020 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and
Gianluca Mazzoni.
All rights reserved.
1

Coca-Cola is the first decisive IRS victory in a
major transfer pricing case since 1979. If not
reversed on appeal, the outcome will mark an
important shift in U.S. transfer pricing litigation
and perhaps indicate that the IRS could win other
major pending cases, such as the one against
Facebook.

In 1979 the IRS won a decisive victory in a
20-year transfer pricing struggle with DuPont,
involving DuPont’s attempt to use a Swiss base
company to shift profits from the United States
2
and high-tax European countries to Switzerland.
The IRS won the case by discovering a “smoking
gun” memorandum that laid out the taxpayer’s
tax avoidance strategy, concluding that the worstcase scenario would lead to payment of the tax
plus interest at a rate below what the taxpayer
could earn on its funds in the interval.
Between 1979 and 1994, the IRS consistently
lost every major transfer pricing case it litigated,
including those against U.S. Steel Corp., Bausch &
Lomb Inc., HCA Healthcare, Eli Lilly and Co.,
G.D. Searle LLC, Ciba-Geigy AG, Sundstrand
3
Corp., and Merck & Co. Inc. After the new
transfer pricing regulations were issued in 1994,
there was a hiatus in transfer pricing litigation.
When cases resumed, the IRS continued losing,
including against DHL Corp. (1998), UPS (1999),
Compaq (1999), Xilinx Inc. (2005), Veritas
Software Corp. (2009), Medtronic Inc. (2016), and
Amazon.com Inc. (2017).
In the last few years, there have been signs that
the IRS litigation effort is improving. In 2018
Medtronic was reversed on appeal and remanded
to the Tax Court, and in Altera the IRS, having lost
decisively in the Tax Court, obtained a reversal on
appeal in 2019, a decision that became final when
the Supreme Court denied certiorari this year.
Even so, the prospects of a decisive IRS victory
in a transfer pricing case remained doubtful. It is

2

E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl.
1979).
3

1

Coca-Cola Co. v. Commissioner, 155 T.C. No. 10 (2020).

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, VOLUME 169, DECEMBER 14, 2020

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study
in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation,” University of Michigan,
Law & Economics Olin Working Paper No. 07-017 and Public Law
Working Paper No. 92 (Sept. 27, 2007).

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/201
®
Electronic
available
at:content,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764501
For morecopy
Tax Notes
Federal
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

1739

2

Avi-Yonah and Mazzoni:

unclear what will happen to Medtronic on remand,
and while Altera was a major victory, it involved a
narrow issue (whether the cost of stock options
must be included in the pool of costs shared under
a cost-sharing agreement). But then came CocaCola, which is unequivocally an IRS victory in a
major case (it involved a $3.3 billion deficiency).
The Case
Coca-Cola is a U.S. company with its
headquarters and principal place of business in
Atlanta. It is the legal owner of all the intellectual
property necessary to manufacture, distribute,
and sell some of the best-known nonalcoholic,
ready-to-drink beverages in the world. CocaCola’s IP includes trademarks, product names,
logos, patents, secret formulas, and proprietary
manufacturing processes. Its international
structure includes several foreign manufacturing
affiliates (supply points), local service companies
(ServCos), and independent bottlers. Coca-Cola

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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licenses the IP to the supply points to produce
4
beverage concentrate. License agreements can be
terminated by Coca-Cola at will without
compensation, do not grant any form of territorial
exclusivity to the supply points, and do not give
the supply points any ownership interest in the IP.
Supply points sell concentrate to unrelated
bottlers, which produce finished beverages for
sale to distributors and retailers worldwide.
The figure represents how Coca-Cola’s
operations were conducted during the relevant
tax years (2007-2009).
During the relevant years, the supply points
compensated Coca-Cola for the use of its IP under
a formula that had been agreed on between CocaCola and the IRS when settling a tax audit in 1996
for the 1987-1995 tax years. The formula
permitted the supply points to retain profit equal
to 10 percent of their gross sales, with the
remaining profit split 50-50 with Coca-Cola.

4

The case involved income adjustments from supply points in Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, and Swaziland. The Irish and
Brazilian supply points accounted for roughly 85 percent of the disputed
income adjustments. All except the Mexican supply point, which
operated as a branch so its income was reported on Coca-Cola’s U.S.
consolidated return, were controlled foreign corporations. Therefore, for
the Mexican supply point, the IRS sought to reduce Coca-Cola’s foreign
tax credits on the ground that the branch had reported insufficient
royalty expenses for the use of Coca-Cola’s intangible property, thus
artificially inflating its income and the Mexican corporate tax paid. The
IRS contended that the Mexican taxes were to that extent
noncompulsory payments ineligible for the FTC. The Tax Court
concluded in an earlier decision that the taxes were creditable because
the taxpayer met both prongs of the compulsory test. See Coca-Cola Co. v.
Commissioner, 149 T.C. 446 (2017).
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However, Coca-Cola’s closing agreement with the
IRS did not address what transfer pricing method
would have been used after 1995, and Coca-Cola
continued to use the 10-50-50 formula to report
income from its foreign supply points.
For the relevant tax years, the IRS claimed that
the 10-50-50 formula was not arm’s length because
it overcompensated the supply points and
undercompensated Coca-Cola for use of the IP.
Invoking section 482, the IRS reallocated income
to Coca-Cola from its foreign supply points using
a comparable profits method, treating the
independent Coca-Cola bottlers as comparable
parties. To implement its bottler CPM, the IRS
determined the average return on operating
assets (ROA) for a group of independent CocaCola bottlers it deemed comparable. It applied
that average ROA to the operating assets of each
supply point, generating a deemed arm’s-length
operating profit, then reallocated to Coca-Cola all
income received by each supply point in excess of
that benchmark.
Coca-Cola challenged the section 482
reallocations as arbitrary and capricious. First, it
contended that the IRS acted arbitrarily by
abandoning the 10-50-50 formula, having
acquiesced in the use of that formula during five
prior audit cycles spanning a decade. Second, it
said the IRS erred in using the bottler CPM to
reallocate income. Coca-Cola relied on a provision
in the closing agreement that it said should have
some prospective operation because it granted
Coca-Cola penalty protection for future years:
For taxable years after 1995, to the extent
the Taxpayer applies the [10-50-50]
method to determine the amount of its
reported Product Royalty income with
respect to existing or any future Supply
Points, the Taxpayer shall be considered to
have met the reasonable cause and good
faith exception of sections 6664(c) and
6662(e)(3)(D) and shall not be subject to
the accuracy-related penalty under section
6662 with respect to the portion of any
underpayment that is attributable to an
adjustment of such Product Royalty.

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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The Tax Court refused that argument, finding
the provision hurt, rather than helped, Coca5
Cola. It said the agreement recognized that the
IRS might make transfer pricing adjustments after
1995 because it gave Coca-Cola penalty protection
for the portion of any underpayment “attributable
to an adjustment of such Product Royalty.”
According to the court:
The short and (we think) the complete
answer to petitioner’s argument is that the
closing agreement says nothing whatever
about the transfer pricing methodology
that was to apply for years after 1995.
Parties to a closing agreement may (and
sometimes do) bind themselves to
particular tax treatments for specified
future years. For its part, petitioner may
have desired the certainty that would arise
from indefinite future application of the
10-50-50 method. But there is no evidence
in the document that the IRS shared that
desire or agreed to implement it.
In arguing that the CPM is inferior to other
methods for pricing transfers of intangible
property, Coca-Cola relied on a statement in the
preamble to the 1994 final transfer pricing
regulations (T.D. 8552) referring to the CPM as “a
6
method of last resort.” The court rejected that
argument, saying the best method rule must be
applied based on the availability of adequate data.
It referred to Example 4 of reg. section 1.482-5(e),
which treats the CPM as the best method for
determining an arm’s-length royalty for the
transfer of intangibles to a foreign affiliate that
performs routine manufacturing functions as the
supply points did. It said in this case, “the

5

For comparison, see Eaton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2017-147,
which involved an IRS departure from past closing agreements (and
advance pricing agreements). Under Eaton, the IRS cannot cancel an
APA based on: (i) a perceived material factual omission or
misrepresentation during APA negotiations if the taxpayer disclosed all
information it reasonably believed relevant and responded thoroughly
to all questions asked; or (ii) the taxpayer’s immaterial and inadvertent
APA compliance errors that it promptly reported and attempted to
correct in good faith. For comment, see Caplin & Drysdale Chtd.,
“Different Viewpoint Not a Misrepresentation: Tax Court Holds IRS
Abused Its Discretion in Cancelling Eaton’s APAs” (Aug. 24, 2017).
6

In the original 1993 proposed transfer pricing regulations, the CPM
was designed as a super-method to check the application of the other
methods. However, that led to vehement protests from trading partners,
who claimed the CPM was not a valid application of the arm’s-length
standard. Thus, the CPM was denigrated in the final regulations. See
Avi-Yonah, supra note 3.
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circumstances that caused Treasury to refer to the
CPM as a ‘method of last resort’” did not exist.
The court also held that none of the three
alternative methods — the comparable
uncontrolled transaction, residual profit-split
(RPSM), and asset management methods — was
the best method for the Coca-Cola case.
Regarding the first alternative method, the
court said Coca-Cola did not identify any pricing
data for transactions with unrelated parties that
involve the transfer of the same intangible, so the
CUT method could not be used. Sanjay Unni, one
of Coca-Cola’s expert witnesses, derived his
support for the CUT method from master
franchising transactions that fast food chains like
McDonald’s and Domino’s Pizza entered into
with regional franchisees abroad. The court
rejected Unni’s analysis for several reasons. First,
the supply points were not responsible for CocaCola foreign businesses, including managing and
overseeing the franchise bottlers, and were not
responsible for consumer marketing activities and
expenditures to exploit and develop Coca-Cola’s
intangibles. Second, supply points could not be
plausibly analogized to master franchisees. The
master franchisee agreements had long terms (10
to 50 years) and conferred territorial exclusivity.
In contrast, supply points had short-term
7
agreements that Coca-Cola could (and often did)
terminate at will and that did not confer any
territorial exclusivity. Third, supply points
manufactured beverage concentrate and did not
play any role in managing the franchise, selecting
subfranchisees, or overseeing bottlers in any
geographic territory. All those activities were
performed by Coca-Cola and the ServCos. Finally,
bottlers could not be analogized to subfranchisees
of the supply points because their agreements
invariably ran with Coca-Cola, not with the
supply points. Bottlers received direction and
marketing assistance from the ServCos, not from
the supply points. Thus, bottlers could not be

7

Aside from the Brazilian agreement, which ran indefinitely but
could be terminated by Coca-Cola’s unilateral action or either party’s
breach of contract, and the Costa Rican agreement, which had an initial
two-month term, all supply point agreements had an initial 12-month
term and were renewed automatically for one-year periods absent prior
notice from Coca-Cola or the supply point. Under the agreements with
Ireland, Mexico, and Swaziland, during any 12-month term, either party
could terminate for any reason on giving 30 or 60 days’ notice.
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compared with owners of restaurants that serve
consumers.
The court also rejected the second alternative
method for several reasons, including three in
particular. First, the supply points did not
perform the economic functions that created
valuable IP, such as implementing consumer
advertising and engaging in franchise leadership
with bottlers — the ServCos did. Second, the
supply points were neither the legal owners of IP
under the IP laws of the relevant jurisdictions nor
holders of rights constituting IP under contractual
terms (such as the terms of a license) or other legal
provisions. Coca-Cola owned the IP involved in
the transactions at issue. Third, Coca-Cola’s
application of the RPSM was solely based on
relative consumer advertising expenditure in the
relevant tax years without factoring in the relative
value of nonroutine IP contributed by Coca-Cola
and the supply points. The court stated:
Wholly apart from past advertising
expenses, however, [Coca-Cola] obviously
brought to the table many other valuable
intangibles — its brands, trademarks,
tradenames, patents, logos, secret
formulas, and proprietary manufacturing
processes. Consumer advertising is worth
little unless the seller has a product that
people wish to buy.
The Tax Court thus found Coca-Cola’s
proposed RPSM a wholly unreliable method. It
also said that even without the above flaws, CocaCola’s proposed RPSM results would have had a
low level of reliability because the value of
nonroutine intangibles was estimated by the
capitalized cost of developing the IP less an
appropriate amount of amortization based on the
useful life of each IP rather than being measured
by external market benchmarks that reflect the
8
IP’s fair market value. It referred to reg. section
1.482-6(c)(3)(ii)(C)(3), which says the soundness
of an RPSM depends on the “reliability of the data
used and the assumptions made in valuing the IP
contributed by the participants. . . . In particular,
if capitalized costs of development are used to
estimate the value of IP, the reliability of the

8

See reg. section 1.482-6T(c)(3)(i)(B)(2).
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results is reduced relative to the reliability of other
methods that do not require such an estimate,”
and reg. section 1.482-6(c)(3)(ii)(D), which states
that, “To the extent the allocation of profits in the
second step is not based on external market
benchmarks, the reliability of the analysis will be
decreased.”
According to the court, Coca-Cola’s
capitalization of intangible development costs
yielded unreliable results for at least two reasons.
First, that required assumptions regarding the
useful life of the IP. The court said, “There is no
consensus among economists that ordinary
advertising costs can be properly be capitalized as
an intangible asset, much less about what the
useful life of such an asset would be.” Second,
those costs might not be related to the IP’s market
value. The court noted that the intangible
described by one of Coca-Cola’s experts was a
capitalization of the historical costs of advertising
Coca-Cola products, saying:
No unrelated party would pay a supply
point a meaningful sum for this supposed
asset, because the asset could not be
usefully deployed by an unrelated party.
In any event, this asset could not be
deployed by an unrelated party without
violating petitioner’s trademarks.
Finally, the court rejected Coca-Cola’s
proposed unspecified, or asset management,
method, which was based on the two-tiered fee
structure typically used to compensate asset
managers in the financial services sector. It said
that method did not remotely resemble any of the
specified methods for valuing intangibles under
the section 482 regulations and compensated
Coca-Cola only for asset management services
involving governance, sharing of best practices,
and high-level strategy, thus ignoring the relevant
intangibles (for example, brands, trademarks, and
secret formulas). The court noted that asset
managers typically do not supply those kinds of
intangibles to the portfolio companies they
manage.
In conclusion, the court determined that the
CPM was the best method because only CocaCola owned the valuable IP and the supply points

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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had no substantive contractual rights to it. It also
found that the unrelated bottlers were
appropriate comparable parties and that the
ROAs were computed using reliable data,
assumptions, and adjustments. It therefore
decided in favor of the IRS.
Comparability
The most surprising aspect of Coca-Cola might
be the IRS’s successful use of the bottlers as
comparables under the CPM. On the face of it, the
supply points that manufacture the concentrate
and the bottlers that mix it with water and bottle
the resulting soft drinks seem to have little in
common because they are at different levels of the
production chain. However, the key distinction is
that while the supply points are controlled (as
they must be, because the Coca-Cola formula is
not patent-protected and its value would be lost if
disclosed to unrelated parties), the bottlers are
independent. Thus, if one accepts that the entire
value of the drinks lies in the IP owned by the U.S.
parent, one could argue that the supply points,
like the bottlers, perform a mechanical function
and should not be rewarded more than contract
manufacturers. As the Tax Court explained:
We agree with the Commissioner’s
conclusion that independent Coca-Cola
bottlers serve as appropriate comparable
parties for purposes of a CPM/ROA
analysis. The bottlers are comparable to
the supply points because they operated
in the same industry, faced similar
economic risks, had similar (but more
favorable) contractual and economic
relationships with petitioner, employed in
the same manner many of the same
intangible assets (petitioner’s brand
names, trademarks, and logos), and
ultimately shared the same income stream
from sales of petitioner’s beverages.
According to the court, the key point was that
“the manufacturing activity in both cases was
routine, consisting largely of mixing ingredients
according to detailed protocols supplied by

9

See Ryan Finley, “Tax Court’s Coca-Cola Ruling: Early Sign of a New
Approach?” Tax Notes Federal, Dec. 7, 2020, p. 1651.

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, VOLUME 169, DECEMBER 14, 2020

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/201
®
Electronic
available
at:content,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764501
For morecopy
Tax Notes
Federal
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

1743

6

Avi-Yonah and Mazzoni:

petitioner.” Quality control (which was important
in Medtronic) was similar in both cases.
The Tax Court acknowledged that in some
ways the bottlers were different from the supply
points. The bottlers had long-term contracts and
territorial exclusivity, while the supply points
could be (and sometimes were) terminated at will
and had no territorial rights. But the court
concluded that those differences should have led
to a higher return on assets for the bottlers, while
in fact they had much lower ROAs, reflecting the
allocation of profits from IP to the supply points.
It said those profits should have been allocated to
the parent.
Marketing Intangibles
The most important difference between the
IRS and Coca-Cola’s positions involved marketing
intangibles. The taxpayer argued that the supply
points’ higher returns were justified because they
bore most of the costs of marketing the products,
and that without marketing the IP was valueless.
That was similar to the position the IRS took in
Glaxo, which involved a drug manufactured in the
United Kingdom and marketed in the United
States, and resulted in the payment of a $3.4
billion settlement (the largest transfer pricing
adjustment in history).10
The court rejected that argument because the
supply points did not in fact conduct any
marketing — they were just allocated marketing
costs. All the actual marketing was done by the
parent and ServCos, which were stipulated to be
compensated at arm’s length:
Petitioner contends that the supply points
bore “marketing risk” because they
funded consumer advertising in foreign
markets. But the supply points had no
operational responsibility for consumer
marketing; they thus bore no risk in the
sense of “mission failure.” Rather,

10
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petitioner simply charged certain ServCos
marketing expenses to the supply points’
books, and it made these charges roughly
concurrently with the supply points’
receipt of vastly larger amounts of income
from the bottlers. Petitioner controlled
how much revenue each supply point
received (by shifting concentrate
production among them) and how much
expense each supply point was charged
(by way of [direct marketing expenses]
and “fees and commissions” allocated to
it). Since the flow of revenue and
marketing expenses to the supply points
was controlled by [the parent], and since
the revenue invariably exceeded the
marketing expenses by a very wide
margin, we do not see how the supply
points bore “marketing risks” in any
realistic sense. Risk is not something that
can be assigned after the fact.
That point is likely to be the main focus of an
appeal because the IRS previously recognized the
importance of the marketing function. However,
it might be difficult to overcome the stipulation
that the ServCos were compensated at arm’s
length for the actual marketing functions they
performed.
Conclusion
In 1993 the IRS introduced advance pricing
agreements as a way to manage transfer pricing
disputes. APAs have now been adopted all over
the world and are a good way to reduce transfer
pricing litigation. The problem, however, is that
APAs are still used only by a minority of U.S.based multinationals because the litigation record
has so favored taxpayers in large transfer pricing
cases that entering into an APA felt like leaving
money on the table.
If Coca-Cola is upheld on appeal, that situation
could change. Perhaps more large U.S.
multinationals would enter into transfer pricing
APAs, as well as binding arbitration under

In GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v. Commissioner, No.
5750-04 (T.C. 2006), in which the original asserted deficiency was $10
billion, the key issue was marketing intangibles used in the global
pharmaceutical business. The IRS made virtually the opposite argument
— that the U.S. subsidiary of the foreign parent was the economic owner
of the marketing intangibles. The case settled transfer pricing disputes
covering tax years going back as far as 1989, and the parties reached a
separate agreement to resolve transfer pricing issues covering tax years
2001 through 2005.

1744

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, VOLUME 169, DECEMBER 14, 2020

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
®
Electronic
available
at:content,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764501
For morecopy
Tax Notes
Federal
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

7

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 201 [2021]

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

TAX PRACTICE

treaties. It may also presage more IRS victories in
cases like Facebook,11 especially because the IRS
won in the Tax Court, where most large transfer
pricing cases begin. The IRS can now apply its
knowledge to litigate other cases.
As has been shown, judges tend to take the
government’s revenue needs into account in
12
deciding large tax cases. With the budget deficit
exploding as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic
and more urgent needs on the horizon, Coca-Cola
may be a harbinger of more taxpayer defeats. 
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See Finley, supra note 9, and Finley, “Facebook Rejects Aggregate IP
Valuation in Transfer Pricing Case,” Tax Notes Federal, Feb. 10, 2020, p.
991.
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Nancy Staudt, The Judicial Power of the Purse: How Courts Fund
National Defense in Times of Crisis (2011).
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